

出手偷摸 摸透iOS app 原來那麼簡單！

Hacks in Taiwan Conference 台灣駭客年會
HITCON X Playground

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#whoami

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- 曾經
擔任 某資安公司 工讀生
- 現今
華梵大學
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#whoami

▪ 專長

iOS安全檢測
數位鑑識處理
駭客攻擊手法

▪ 協助檢測

金融單位App
通訊軟體App
遊戲App

▪ 相關證照

Certificated Ethical Hacker
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator
ISO 27001 / ISO 20000 / BS 10012





2005




2013

以往都是從新聞事件開始...

• FREE

Figure 2a. What Data is Most Often Collected


● iOS
● ANDROID



• FREE

Figure 2b. Where the Data Goes

● iOS
● ANDROID




App超愛
You的隱私

蘋果百萬筆UDID資料外洩元凶是iOS App開發商


Intrepidus Group資料鑑識專家發現多筆資料內含有Blue Toad一詞或相關詞，於是決定通知該公司。BlueToad雖然藉藉無名，但該公司的技術卻可能接觸到上百萬名使用者資料。它為6000多家出版商提供數位出版和應用建置服務，每月處理的網頁瀏覽率高達1億頁。

文/ 林妍臻 | 2012-09-11 發表

按讚加入iThome粉絲團追蹤  讚 <3,835

 讚 分享 <0

 +1 <4



資料鑑識專家發現到洩露源頭指向iOS App開發商Blue Toad。

上周駭客宣稱自FBI筆電取得上千萬筆蘋果裝置的UDID資料之後，經資料鑑識專家追查，發現iOS的數位出版開發商Blue Toad嫌疑重大，Blue Toad執行長Paul DeHart並已向媒體坦承，資料確實是該公司所洩露。

上周自稱是AntiSec成員的駭客宣稱自FBI取得高達1200筆蘋果用戶裝置辨識號

不良開發商 導致Your隱私被看透




你知道有幾個人在看你嘛？

今天來聊

iOS app 全身檢查的方法

app現況疾病檢查方法

- 只針對後端安全去檢測
 - 檢測方法，跟以往一樣
 - 檢測的工具，可以沿用
- 前端mobile檢測技術，資訊太少
 - 前端檢測工具並不多



OWASP

世界衛生組織

為了降低app罹癌提供風險準則

OWASP Top Ten Mobile Risks

OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks

M1 – Weak Server Side Controls

M2 – Insecure Data Storage

M3 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

M4 - Unintended Data Leakage

M5 - Poor Authorization and Authentication

M6 - Broken Cryptography

M7 - Client Side Injection

M8 - Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs

M9 - Improper Session Handling

M10 - Lack of Binary Protections

OWASP Top Ten Mobile Risks 最新版本 2014 RC 1

常見的故事



M1

Weak Server Side Controls


使伺服器端安全控制脆弱



IPC




網路傳輸



後端伺服器

App 傳輸資料
儲存



實體偷取

常見的故事

M2

Insecure Data Storage

不安全的資料儲存於用戶端

M6

Broken Cryptography

加密方法不嚴謹或失效。



IPC



後端伺服器

App 傳輸資料
儲存



實體偷取



常見的故事

M3

Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
傳輸層保護不足



常見的故事

M4



Unintended Data Leakage
非故意/意外造成資料外洩。

M8



網路傳輸



Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs
對於不受信任輸入來源的檢測處置。

後端伺服器

M10

App 傳輸資料
儲存



Lack of Binary Protections
封裝檔案保護不足。

實體偷取

常見的故事

M5

Poor Authorization and Authentication
身分鑑別與授權機制不嚴謹。



使用者輸入

M9


Improper Session Handling
連線階段處理不適當。



IPC



網路傳輸




後端伺服器



App 傳輸資料
儲存



實體偷取



自己用App自己摸


「讓你親自動手摸，摸的的開心，摸的自然。」



主靜月能

摸法

動月能



檢測準備



iDevice JailBroken



Sniffer Packet


靜能

摸法




靜態檢測

- 檢查Binary
 - ipa為壓縮檔案
 - Strings找垃圾
 - Code Review 最佳



靜態檢測







- ✦ 儲存於app內資料
 - ✦ Plist or SQLite or binary
 - ✦ Document
 - ✦ Library
 - ✦ Preferences
 - ✦ Caches
 - ✦ Background Screenshot
- ✦ KeyChain

靜態檢測工具

- iFile / iTools / iFunbox
- Hex Viewer
- Plist Viewer
- SQLite Viewer
- Clutch + IDA

Demo





gidb

gidb Features


- Simplified pentesting setup
 - Setup port forwarding
 - Certificate management
- iOS log viewer
- Screen shot utility
 - Simplifies testing for the creation of backgrounding screenshots
- App-related functions
 - App binary
 - Download
 - List imported libraries
 - Check for encryption, ASLR, stack canaries
 - Decrypt and download an app binary (requires [dumpdecrypted](#))
 - Launch an app
 - View app details such as name, bundleid, and `Info.plist` file.
- Inter-Process Communication
 - URL Handlers
 - List URL handlers
 - Invoke and fuzz URL handlers
 - Pasteboard monitor
- Analyze local file storage
 - Search for, download, and view plist files
 - Search for, download, and view sqlite databases
 - Search for, download, and view local caches (`Cache.db`)
 - File system browser
- Install utilities on iDevices
 - Install [iOS SSL killswitch](#)
 - alpha: Compile and install [dumpdecrypted](#)
- Alpha:
 - Cycrypt console
 - Snoop-It integration

<https://github.com/dmayer/idb>

Demo

動能

摸法



動態檢測

- API調用
- 網路傳輸封包
- 檔案系統讀寫
- Keychain調用
- 調用方法

以往
動態檢測需要以下工具來協助


class-dump-z

Cycript

gdb

....

對囉！
還有App的封包還沒看！



建立一個Proxy Server

Wi-Fi SMC

搜尋網域 smc

用戶端識別碼

更新租約

HTTP 代理伺服器

關閉 手動 自動

伺服器 ProxyIP

傳輸埠 8080

認證

設定iOS ProxyIP



PortSwigger CA

Not Trusted [Install](#)

Received Jan 9, 2013
Contains Certificate

More Details >



PortSwigger CA

Trusted

Received Jan 9, 2013
Contains Certificate

More Details >

將憑證安裝至手機中

分析封包的環境

A screenshot of the Burp Suite Free Edition v1.6 interface. The 'Intercept' tab is active, showing a list of intercepted HTTP requests. The selected request is a POST to '/TPBusAPI/ExpoAPI/PostResponse.aspx'. The 'Raw' tab is selected, displaying the raw HTTP request. The request body contains a SQLite database dump for a table named 'tableMobileInfosMobileInfos'.

#	Host	Method	URL	Params
12	http://itsapi.taipei.gov.tw	POST	/TPBusAPI/ExpoAPI/PostResponse.aspx	
13	http://itsapi.taipei.gov.tw	GET	/TPBusAPI/ExpoAPI/marquee.aspx	

```
POST /TPBusAPI/ExpoAPI/PostResponse.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: itsapi.taipei.gov.tw
Proxy-Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; charset=utf-8;
boundary=0xKhTmLbOuNdArY
Content-Length: 20634
Connection: close
User-Agent: 6.2.1 rv:20140624 (iPhone; iPhone OS
7.0.6; zh_TW)


--0xKhTmLbOuNdArY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Sqlite";
filename="Log.Sqlite"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

SQLite format 3@
* ## tableMobileInfosMobileInfos CREATE TABLE
```


A screenshot of a web browser displaying a news article from itsapi.taipei.gov.tw. The article title is '公館商圈8月起試辦 慢行/徒步區' and the content discusses traffic management measures in the Gongguan area starting from August 2nd, 2014. The browser's address bar shows the URL 'http://itsapi.taipei.gov.tw/TPBusAPI/ExpoAPI/marquee.aspx?phone=iphone&Content=ALL'.

公館商圈8月起試辦 慢行/徒步區_自103年8月2日起試辦「公館慢行/徒步區」3個月，於每週六、日、中秋節及國慶日中午12時至晚上10時進行交通管制，禁止汽機車通行，僅開放行人及自行車使用，管制範圍包含羅斯福路3段316巷及羅斯福路4段24巷等5條巷道(範圍詳連結),_http://idot.taipei.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=80090296&ctNode=46381&mp=117003,_I_Android版臺北好行已更改停車場功能為直接連結北市好停車App，尚未更新北市好停車App版本者，可能發生錯誤關閉訊息，遇此情形請先更新北市好停車App，造成您的不便，敬請見諒。_

Device




Proxy



Server

What !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





Snoop-it

Monitoring

- File system access (print data protection classes)
- Keychain access
- HTTP(S) connections (NSURLConnection)
- Access to sensitive API (address book, photos etc.)
- Debug outputs (NSLog)
- Tracing App internals (objc_msgSend)

Analysis/Manipulation

- Fake hardware identifier (UDID, Wireless MAC, etc.)
- Fake location/GPS data
- Explore and force display of available ViewController
- List custom URL schemes
- List available Objective-C classes, objects and methods
- Invoke arbitrary methods at runtime
- Bypass basic jailbreak detection mechanisms

Other

- Simple installation and configuration
- Easy to use graphical user interface
- Plenty of filter and search options
- Detailed description of the [XML-RPC web service interface](#)

安裝步驟

1. 新增軟體源

<http://repo.nesolabs.de/>


2. 搜尋snoop-it 進行安裝



使用說明

1. 選擇需要分析的app

2. 開啟瀏覽器進行分析




Demo



App永遠都是你
最佳的解密工具



還是想知道key是什麼！



Introspsy

The Problem

In 2013, assessing the security of iOS applications still involves a lot of manual, time-consuming tasks - especially when performing a black-box assessment. Without access to source code, a comprehensive review of these application currently requires in-depth knowledge of various APIs and the ability to use relatively complex, generic tools such as Cycrypt, or Mobile Substrate - or just jump straight into the debugger.

To simplify this process, we are releasing Introspsy - an open-source security profiler for iOS. Introspsy is designed to help penetration testers understand what an application does at runtime.

How Introspsy works

The tool comprises two separate components: Introspsy-iOS and Introspsy-Analyzer.

Introspsy-iOS is a tracer that can be installed on a jailbroken iOS device. It will hook security-sensitive APIs called by a given application, including functions related to cryptography, IPCs, data storage / protection, networking, and user privacy. The call details are all recorded and persisted in a SQLite database on the device

This database can then be fed to Introspsy-Analyzer, which generates an HTML report displaying all recorded calls, plus a list of potential vulnerabilities affecting the application.

Tracer

Once installed, Introspsy-iOS will store in a SQLite database all calls made by iOS applications to security-sensitive APIs.

<https://github.com/iSECPartners/Introspsy-iOS>

Live Demo

gidb

gidb
ifunbox

Burp Suite
OWASP ZAP

Snoop-it
Introspy

Binary
檢查

儲存資料檢查

傳輸過程

進階測試

是否有完善保護

是否有敏感資訊

是否將敏感資料加密
是否有敏感資料

Cache
DebugLog
KeyChain
BackGround
Screenshot
是否有敏感資料

伺服器是否有證制
驗機

傳送敏感資料是否加密

Runtime
攻擊

是否取得加密Key
高權限



App安全
取決於App的需求性

研究生禮貌運動！

-Be kind to Postgraduated

1. 看到研究生請不要露出「你怎麼還沒畢業？」的表情
- Don't show the "why do you still here?" look!
2. 切勿詢問研究生何時畢業、論文進度、現在幾年級、何時初審、口試？
- Don't ask the questions about time!!
3. 部分研究生不太喜歡討論與指導教授的相處狀況，請察言觀色。
- Don't talk about their Boss!!!
4. 遇見研究生進行紓壓休閒娛樂時，請不要提醒他/她論文還沒寫！
- Don't tell them live.pixnet.net/blog
"Your thesis haven't done yet!"



Q&A